Intercepting free falling objects: Better use Occam’s razor than internalize Newton’s law  by Baurès, Robin et al.
www.elsevier.com/locate/visres
Vision Research 47 (2007) 2982–2991Intercepting free falling objects: Better use Occam’s razor
than internalize Newton’s law
Robin Baure`s *, Nicolas Benguigui, Michel-Ange Amorim, Isabelle Anne Siegler
Universite´ Paris-Sud, UPRES EA 4042, Controˆle Moteur et Perception, 91405 Orsay, France
Received 22 December 2006; received in revised form 12 July 2007Abstract
Several studies have recently provided empirical data supporting the view that gravity has been embodied in a quantitative internal
model of gravity thereby permitting access to exact time-to-contact (TTC) when intercepting a free falling object. In this review, we dis-
cuss theoretical and methodological concerns with the experiments that supposedly support the assumption of a predictive and accurate
model of gravity. Having done so, we then propose that only a ‘‘qualitative implicit physics knowledge’’ of the eﬀects of gravity is used as
an approximate pre-information that inﬂuences timing of interceptive actions in the speciﬁc case of free falling objects. Clear evidence
remains to be provided to deﬁne how this knowledge is combined with optical information for on-line timing of interceptive actions.
 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Throughout human evolution, phylogenesis has embod-
ied many durable environmental constraints that humans
meet. Gravity (g) is one of these major and durable con-
straints. The most notable consequence of gravity is to
accelerate any object in free fall, by a relatively constant
value (about 9.81 m/s2 at sea level, with a <1% maximum
variation with latitude and/or altitude (Zago & Lacquaniti,
2005b)). McIntyre, Zago, Berthoz, and Lacquaniti (2001)
proposed that the relative constancy of gravity enables it
to be taken into account in interceptive actions through
the application of an internal model of gravity. This inter-
nalization would enable individuals to overcome the well
known visual failure to perceive the acceleration of objects
(Werkhoven, Snippe, & Toet, 1992) and thus would permit
an exact prediction of the time-to-contact of a free falling0042-6989/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.visres.2007.07.024
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37.
E-mail address: robin.baures@u-psud.fr (R. Baure`s).object; TTC is the time remaining before the object reaches
the observer or a speciﬁc point of interception.
In this paper we review studies that purportedly support
the use of an internal model of gravity (e.g., Zago et al.,
2004). Subsequently, we discuss why these works do not
present unequivocal evidence for such a model. We then
argue that humans’ only use qualitative ‘‘implicit physics
knowledge’’ of gravity eﬀects to facilitate interception of
free falling objects rather than a quantitative internal
model of gravity.1.1. Studies supporting the internal model of gravity
The hypothesis of the internal model of gravity in inter-
ceptive actions has been addressed in a large number of
studies beginning with the seminal work by Lacquaniti
and Maioli (1989a, 1989b). In a ﬁrst experiment, Lacquan-
iti and Maioli (1989a) showed that the onset of anticipa-
tory EMG in wrist and elbow muscles occurred at the
same time before contact (e.g., 150 ms in case of the biceps)
regardless of the initial height of the ball (ranging from 0.2
to 1.6 m). This result was interpreted by the authors as
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model of gravity (TTCg) instead of TTC obtained from a
ﬁrst order information such as s(h),1 neglecting the acceler-
ation of the moving object (TTC1). Indeed, Lacquaniti and
Maioli (1989a) argued that if responses were produced on
the basis of a constant value of TTC1, as was proposed ear-
lier by Lee, Young, Reddish, Lough, and Clayton (1983),
then EMG peak activity would not have occurred at a con-
stant value of TTC. In a second experiment with the same
task, Lacquaniti and Maioli (1989b) showed that partici-
pants were able to time the grasp of the ball without seeing
it during free fall and implied that they used instead the
height of fall and an auditory cue that signalled the time
of release. This result was interpreted as evidence that par-
ticipants stored in memory the speciﬁc value of gravita-
tional acceleration, and then used it to predict the exact
TTC of the ball.
The use of an internal model of gravity was also tested
as part of a Neurolab space shuttle mission (McIntyre
et al., 2001) in which astronauts had to catch balls pro-
jected ‘‘vertically’’ to their hand by a ball machine with
three diﬀerent initial velocities. A ﬁrst session was carried
out on Earth (1 g condition), followed by a second session
during the ﬂight in space (0 g condition). On Earth, antic-
ipatory catching responses (weak rotation of the arm and
EMG peak of the biceps) were well synchronized with
the arrival of the ball, independent of the initial projection
velocity, conﬁrming the previous results of Lacquaniti and
Maioli (1989a, 1989b). In Space, anticipatory responses
occurred earlier (with respect to impact time) than in 1 g
condition (i.e., at a greater TTC than in the 1 g condition).
These results led McIntyre et al. (2001) to reject both (1)
control of the anticipatory responses on the basis of
TTC1; in this case, anticipatory responses should have
occurred later in the 0 g condition than they did, and (2)
direct perception of the acceleration of the ball; in this case,
no diﬀerence should have been observed between 0 and 1 g
conditions. McIntyre et al. (2001) came to the conclusion
that the brain anticipates the gravitational acceleration of
downward moving objects, even in outer space where no
gravity applies.
Zago and Lacquaniti (2005a), Zago et al. (2004, 2005)
tested the validity of the internal model of gravity using a
virtual system to simulate free falling balls. In these exper-
iments, the fall of the virtual ball was coupled with the
release of a real ball by an electromagnet behind a screen.
The two balls arrived in synchrony at the interception
point, situated just below the lower border of the screen,
and participants were required to punch the real ball. With
the real ball being hidden by the screen, participants had to
produce their movement using the information provided by
the virtual ball. In a ﬁrst study with two conditions of1 s(h) is the inverse of the rate of expansion of the angle h formed by the
object with respect to the observer (Lee, 1976). Theoretically, s can be used
to optically specify the exact TTC for objects moving at constant velocity
and an approximation of TTC for objects accelerating (Tresilian, 1995).acceleration (0 and 1 g), Zago et al. (2004) showed initial
high performance for the 1 g motion with a low improve-
ment of the success rate with practice; 80% for the ﬁrst ﬁve
trials and 92% for the last ﬁve trials. Initial performance for
the 0 g motion was weak at 20% but there was a large
improvement of success rate to 59%, although it did not
reach the level exhibited in the 1 g condition. Maximum
velocity of the hand was attained at the time of impact in
1 g condition (2 ± 24 ms), whereas it was reached earlier
(with respect to impact time) in the 0 g condition
(93 ± 78 ms). According to Zago et al. (2004), these
results demonstrated that the internalization of Newton’s
laws in the internal model of gravity allows perfect timing
for the interception of a ball in free fall.
However, the use of an internal model of gravity in
interceptive actions seems to be context-dependent, as
shown by Zago et al. (2004) in a second experiment. Partic-
ipants were asked to press a button when the virtual target
reached an interception point. As in the ﬁrst experiment,
the virtual target was either presented with a 0 or 1 g accel-
eration but now there was no real ball was falling at the
same time behind the screen. Results indicated that better
performance was obtained for 0 g motion (timing error of
0 ± 31 ms) than for 1 g motion (21 ± 40 ms). This observa-
tion led Zago et al. (2004) to conclude that the 1 g model is
activated only with real balls to be intercepted while a 0 g
model is used for virtual objects which are seen as having
no mass and thus not subjected to the eﬀect of gravity.
Further research was carried out by Senot, Zago, Lac-
quaniti, and McIntyre (2005), who tested the use of an
internal model of gravity when facing congruent or contra-
dictory visual and proprioceptive information. In this
study, participants immersed in a virtual environment
(head-mounted display) had to press a button to start the
movement of an interceptor in order to collide with a ball.
The ball could either fall from the ceiling (above condition)
or rise from the ground (below condition). To add propri-
oceptive information that contributed to orientation, par-
ticipants had to look up (head pitched up) to intercept
balls falling from above or to look down (head pitched
down) to intercept balls rising from below. The ball could
adopt three accelerations: coherent (downward accelerat-
ing or upward decelerating motion) or incoherent (down-
ward decelerating or upward accelerating motion) with
gravity, and constant velocity motion (zero acceleration).
Results showed that interception success rate was greater
in constant velocity condition than in accelerated and
decelerated conditions, regardless of motion direction.
However, motion direction interacted with acceleration
condition such that for both the above and below condi-
tions, success rate was higher when ball motion was coher-
ent with the eﬀect of gravity. Moreover, response initiation
timing was near ideal for constant velocity motion but sig-
niﬁcantly earlier for the above condition (87 ± 105 ms
prior impact) than for the below condition (62 ± 102 ms
prior impact) independent of acceleration. These results
indicate that participants improve their performance when
2984 R. Baure`s et al. / Vision Research 47 (2007) 2982–2991acceleration is coherent with direction of motion, by initi-
ating the response earlier when the ball falls from the ceil-
ing and later when the ball rises from the ground. The role
of head pitch was conﬁrmed in a control experiment that
used identical visual scenes but with participants required
to maintain their head parallel to the ground. Like in the
primary experiment, success rate was higher for 0 g motion
than for 1 or 1 g motions. However, there was no longer
any signiﬁcant interaction between direction of motion and
acceleration. Senot et al. (2005) concluded that an internal
model of gravity is only used when visual and propriocep-
tive information are congruent, leading to anticipated
responses when the ball comes from above and delayed
responses when the ball comes from below.
Finally, Indovina et al. (2005) undertook an fMRI
experiment to identify the neural substrates of the 1 g
model. The experimental setup involved virtual balls dis-
played on a screen with pseudo-realistic cues to provide
indications about up and down (e.g., a woman holding a
basket above her head, and standing in front of a building)
and about the distance travelled by the ball in order to
make the scene more natural. Balls moved ‘‘down’’ with
either a 1 or 1 g acceleration. Participants were asked
to press a button when the virtual ball reached the ﬁxation
point. Data showed that the insulae and the temporopari-
etal junctions located in the vestibular cortex were acti-
vated when the visual acceleration matched gravity. In
contrast, when facing a 1 g acceleration this area was
not activated but there was a signiﬁcantly stronger
response around the lateral occipital sulcus in the middle
and inferior occipital gyri, an area known to be sensitive
to visual movement (Orban et al., 2003). The activation
of the vestibular cortex in the 1 g condition led Indovina
et al. (2005) to conclude that it provides a neural substrate
to the internal model of gravity.
In summary, it appears that the internal model of grav-
ity has been investigated extensively and that a large
amount of empirical data converges to demonstrate the
eﬀective use of this implicit knowledge in the timing of
interceptive actions (Zago & Lacquaniti, 2005c). This
model can be deﬁned as a predictive forward model (Wol-
pert, Ghahramani, & Flanagan, 2001) and would permit
the exact estimation of TTC for the production of a move-
ment programmed on the basis of this estimation. How-
ever, we will argue that some questions regarding the
involvement of this model have not always been addressed
correctly and that the role of this internal model has been
considerably exaggerated. We will highlight some method-
ological and theoretical problems that call into question
whether this model, especially in its quantitative form,
plays such an important role in catching.
In the next section, a critical examination of the meth-
ods used in the above mentioned studies will be presented
and some alternative interpretations to the obtained results
will be proposed. Then, we will examine the theoretical lim-
its of the quantitative internal model of gravity. Finally, we
will explain how a qualitative internal model of gravitycould be used in very speciﬁc situations to modulate the
timing of interceptive actions.
1.2. Methodological limits and alternative interpretations of
empirical and neurophysiological data
Using EMG analyses, Lacquaniti and Maioli (1989b)
showed that participants were able to time the grasp of a
ball in free fall without seeing it after release. Instead, it
was proposed that they timed the grasp using knowledge
of the height of fall in combination with an auditory cue
signalling the time of release. This result was interpreted
as evidence that priori knowledge of g provided an estima-
tion of the time of fall. However, this catching task can be
interpreted as a time retention task, in which participants
could simply learn during the initial trials the temporal
interval between two sensory cues, one auditory and the
other tactile. This would then provide a representation of
a simple relationship between ball release height and time
of fall, which after training would enable participants to
produce a motor response to coincide with the tactile cue
at a given time after the auditory one. Indeed, some studies
have shown that people have good representations of short
durations, especially when the estimation is made shortly
after the presentation of the temporal interval (e.g., Cle´-
ment & Droit-Volet, 2006), such as in Lacquaniti and Mai-
oli (1989b).
Another important ﬁnding which seems to support the
internal model of gravity concerns the constant timing
observed in tasks with diﬀerent drop heights (Lacquaniti
& Maioli, 1989a). We would like to point out that this
observation is not true for all muscles. Lacquaniti and
Maioli (1989a) observed that the moment of anticipatory
EMG activity in wrist extensor varied depending on the
height of release, as predicted by the TTC1 hypothesis.
Further, for other muscles in which the initiation of
anticipatory EMG activity was made at constant time
before contact, alternative explanations are once again pos-
sible. First, in these studies, the three lowest drop heights
(0.2, 0.4 and 0.8 m) were characterized by very short pre-
sentation times (202, 286 and 404 ms, respectively). For
objects released from such a low drop height, and hence
with a very short time of presentation, it can be suggested
that the participant must simply react as fast as possible to
have any chance to catch the ball. The implication, there-
fore, is that no information about the kinematics of the
moving object was used after its release. For the two high-
est drop heights (1.2 and 1.6 m), time of presentation was
long enough to permit the use of visual feedback from
the ball’s kinematics (495 and 571 ms, respectively). How-
ever, it is well known since Lee et al. (1983), that when
an accelerating ball approaches contact, the diﬀerence
between TTC1 and TTC2 (i.e., the temporal relationship
between an object and an observer, based on a second
order information such as g) is very small (see Fig. 1).
For instance, in Lacquaniti and Maioli’s experiment
(1989a), with an actual TTC of 150 ms before contact
Fig. 1. Evolution of TTC1 as a function of TTC2 for the ﬁve drop heights. At 150 ms before the contact (see dashed line), values of TTC1 are 164, 174,
184, 221 and 310 ms for the highest to lowest drop heights, respectively. Except for the shortest drop height, for which an alternative strategy is possible,
values of TTC2 and TTC1 are too close to determine experimentally whether TTC1 or TTC2 is used.
R. Baure`s et al. / Vision Research 47 (2007) 2982–2991 2985(i.e., when the bursts of EMG begin) the diﬀerence between
TTC1 and TTC2 was 14 and 24 ms for a 1.6 and 1.2 m
drop height, respectively. This diﬀerence is certainly too
small to be distinguished on the bases of the EMG analysis
used by Lacquaniti and Maioli (1989a). Therefore, the use
of an optical variable giving access to TTC1, even if not
demonstrated, cannot be excluded and could explain
equally well the timing of EMG responses.
Similarly, in the experiment of McIntyre et al. (2001),
the diﬀerence obtained in the timing of EMG activity in
space or on Earth was very small (about 30 ms). The use
of the quantitative internal model of gravity should have
led to diﬀerences between hand and ball timing of 234,
517 and 1781 ms for initial velocities of 2.7, 1.7 and
0.7 m/s, respectively. Consequently, these ﬁndings on
EMG activity do not provide a quantitative validation of
the use of g for the timing of interceptive action. The
30 ms diﬀerence only showed that in absence of gravity,
interceptive movements were triggered a little sooner (with
respect to impact time) than in 1 g condition. The only con-
clusion that one can draw from this small diﬀerence in tim-
ing, is that qualitative knowledge of gravity had a weak
modulating eﬀect on the timing of interception action.
We do not believe that it should be viewed as a clear and
unquestionable proof for the use of a quantitative internal
model of gravity.
Other methodological limits exist in the experimental
design developed by Zago and Lacquaniti (2005a); Zago
et al. (2004, 2005). A real ball was released behind a screen
while a virtual ball was projected on the screen with various
velocities and accelerations. This experimental design was
used (1) to suggest to the participants that the ball had a
mass and was submitted to the gravity and (2) to enable
the experimenters to manipulate the acceleration of the
visual stimulus. Although technically advanced, this device
is not bias-proof. Indeed, the main problem comes fromthe diﬀerences in the velocity between the virtual and real
balls at the point of interception, which induce diﬀerences
in the time window available to make a precise and
successful contact. The time window can be expressed as
follows:
Time window ¼ ðSb þ SiÞ=V b; ð1Þ
where Sb is the size of the ball, Si the size of the interceptor
and Vb the velocity of the ball when entering the intercep-
tion zone. This corresponds to the time interval during
which the object remains in the interceptive zone, and thus
represents the temporal precision required for intercepting
a moving object (McLeod, McGlaughlin, & Nimmo-Smith,
1985; Tresilian & Lonergan, 2002). Because this very
important constraint was not controlled in their experi-
ments, the conclusion provided by Zago et al. is question-
able. For instance, in these experiments participants had to
deal with both an expected time window that corresponded
to the virtual ball they could see and a real time window
that corresponded to the real ball they had to intercept.
When the virtual ball was released with an acceleration
of 1 g, the diﬀerence in velocity at the interception point
was small, and the expected time window and real time
window were quite similar (Fig. 2a).This led participants
to very quickly reach a good timing performance. When
the virtual ball fell with an acceleration of 0 g, the diﬀer-
ence in velocity at interception point was large and the ex-
pected time window and real time window were very
diﬀerent (Fig. 2b); 214 ms for the virtual ball and 24 ms
for the real ball in the 0 g condition with an initial velocity
of 0.7 m/s. It is perhaps not surprising to observe large er-
rors in participants’ responses in trials with such discrepan-
cies between expectancies about the accuracy required in
the interceptive action according to the virtual ball and
the accuracy required to intercept the real ball. Moreover,
the conﬂict that existed between the visual information
Fig. 2. (a and b) Diﬀerences in expected time windows from the virtual ball and the real ball falling behind the screen in the 1 g condition (panel a) and in
the 0 g condition (panel b) with diﬀerent initial velocities. Time windows are calculated for an interceptor of 6 cm and a ball of 9 cm after a 2.04 m fall, and
taking friction due to air resistance into account.
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ball behind the screen that participants would have deﬁned
after trials in the 0 g condition, could also explain why par-
ticipants did not approach the level of accuracy and the
consistency in timing observed in conditions with no con-
ﬂict between time windows (i.e., the 1 g condition). Conse-
quently, it is possible to question the conclusions of Zago
et al. about the use of a quantitative internal model of grav-
ity which would explain why participants adopt a perfect
timing in the 1 g condition.
Interestingly, our interpretation is supported by the sec-
ond experiment carried out by Zago et al. (2004). In this
experiment there was no real ball falling behind the screen,
and hence there was no conﬂict between the expected time
window and real time window. Under such conditions, the
timing accuracy at 0 g was clearly better than at 1 g. In con-
trast to the authors, we believe that rather than assuming
the virtual ball was considered as having no mass and
therefore not submitted to gravity, the results could be
due to the absence of a discrepancy between the expected
time window and real time window. Hence, participants
could perform better at 0 g because of the inability of the
visual system to take acceleration into account (e.g., Ben-
guigui, Ripoll, & Broderick, 2003 for a similar result).
Another line of evidence belying Zago et al’s., 2004
results comes from studies showing that a target’s velocity
strongly aﬀects movement time (MT) in interceptive
actions (e.g., Brenner & Smeets, 2005; Brenner, Smeets,
& de Lussanet, 1998; Tresilian & Plooy, 2006). Because this
eﬀect of target’s velocity on MT, the use of a virtual simu-
lation with a velocity diﬀerent from the velocity of the real
ball to be intercepted will necessarily induce inadequate
movements and errors in timing.
Finally, in the studies of Zago and Lacquaniti, changes
in velocity and/or acceleration of the ball were not compen-
sated for by changes in viewing distance (VD) to maintain
viewing time (VT) constant across all conditions. It has
been shown that a decrease in V associated with an increase
of VT induces an increase in MT and variability (Brenner
& Smeets, 1996; Carnahan & MacFadyen, 1996). This pro-
vides an alternative explanation for the larger variabilityobserved in motor responses in the 0 g condition, charac-
terized by a greater VT and a slower velocity of the simu-
lated target. Conducting the same experiment and
maintaining an equal VT and time window in the intercep-
tion zone, would avoid this conﬂict. This could be achieved
by varying the release of release of the virtual and real balls
in such a way that they enter the interception zone at the
same time and with the same velocity. However, because
the real ball accelerates at g, the diﬀerence between
expected time window and real time window can only be
minimized and not completely avoided as in the case of a
virtual ball falling with a 0 g.
Results obtained by Senot et al. (2005) also donot provide
undeniable proof for the use of a quantitative internal model
of gravity. Indeed, even if a small eﬀect of gravity was high-
lighted when visual and proprioceptive information were
coherent, results showed that timing accuracy was better in
0 g condition (constant velocity) than in the most coherent
conditions of acceleration and deceleration. The use of a
quantitative internal model of gravity should have led to a
better accuracy in the 1 g conditions with congruent propri-
oceptive information than in the 0 g. Instead, the results are
more consistent with the use of qualitative version, which
would allow a reduction of errors for targets accelerating
or decelerating under the eﬀect of gravity. For instance, tim-
ing of interceptive actions could be modulated, by anticipat-
ing the time taken when the object moves downward and
then delaying the response when the object moves upwards.
Moreover, the conclusion of Senot et al. (2005) regard-
ing the importance of coherence between visual and propri-
oceptive information for the possible use of an internal
model of gravity, questions the neuroimaging study by
Indovina et al. (2005) where visual gravity did not coincide
with proprioceptive gravity. In this fMRI experiment, par-
ticipants were required to lie supine on a bed while viewing
the scene through a tilted mirror, which resulted in visual
motion orthogonal to gravity, and corresponding to the
control experiment of Senot et al. (2005) in which no evi-
dence was found for the use of the quantitative internal
model of gravity (see also Nagai, Kazai, & Yagi, 2002
for a similar result).
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(2005) related to the use a photograph of surroundings to
provide realism and visual cues to counterbalance the dis-
crepancy between visual and proprioceptive gravity. The
use of a virtual simulation contradicts the conclusion of
Zago et al. (2004) who stated that virtual balls are regarded
as having no mass and thus do not involve the quantitative
internal model of gravity. If the hypothesis of Zago et al.
(2004) is valid, it still remains to be proved that the addi-
tion of surroundings to provide realism to the simulation
would be suﬃcient enough to make participants perceive
the ball as having a mass in this virtual environment.
To summarise this section, we suggest that together
these methodological limits in studies aimed at demonstrat-
ing the role of a quantitative internal model of gravity, cast
some doubts on its eﬀective use in interceptive actions. We
propose that these doubts are reinforced in the following
section, where we present a critical examination of the real
capacity of such a model to provide accurate timing for the
interception of falling objects.1.3. Theoretical limits of the quantitative model of gravity
In the studies supposedly supporting the quantitative
internal model of gravity, little is said about how this
knowledge is used in the timing of interceptive actions.
One can understand that it provides information to obtain
TTC. If this idea is developed, one can suppose that an
integrated knowledge of gravity (g) would be computed
with a perception of the falling distance (d) and the velocity
of the fall (v) to obtain TTCg, the time of fall, on the basis
of the following equation:
TTCg ¼ mþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
m2 þ 2g d
p
g
ð2Þ
(Senot et al., 2005). This time would then be used to pro-
gram a response at a time equal to TTCg.
Adhering strictly to the use of a quantitative internal
model of gravity, one might question the constancy of
the value of g on Earth. Even if one agrees with Zago
and Lacquaniti (2005b) that the variation of g with latitude
or altitude has little eﬀect on the value of g, a second factor
can have an important eﬀect upon gravitational accelera-
tion: air resistance. The assumption of the quantitative
internal model of gravity ﬁts well with the theory of Galileo
according to whom the time to fall and the vertical velocity
of a falling object is independent of its weight and only
dependent on the force of gravity. But this principle is true
only in the vacuum or on the moon (where there is no
atmosphere and gravity is about 1.62 m/s2) or for an object
whose density is suﬃciently high for air resistance to be
neglected. However, there are many cases of interception
in which air resistance is opposed to the force of gravity
and cannot be neglected. The eﬀect of air resistance, as a
function of the mass of the object, is seldom acknowledged
in articles about the quantitative internal model of gravity.Some of these works have simply mentioned the eﬀect of
mass on air resistance (Zago & Lacquaniti, 2005a; Zago
et al., 2004, 2005) whereas other articles did not even com-
ment (Lacquaniti & Maioli, 1989a, 1989b; Senot et al.,
2005; Zago & Lacquaniti, 2005b, 2005c). Because of the
lack of interest on this factor, and because an acceleration
of precisely 1 g is as scarce as a constant velocity motion,
the eﬀect of air resistance and the factors which are
involved in this eﬀect must be clariﬁed.
If no air resistance was applied to a falling object, the
only force acting would be its weight (~w, with a vertical axis
oriented downwards). According to Newton’s second law
X
~F orces ¼ m~a
 
; we know that : ~w ¼ m~a ð3Þ
in which~a is the acceleration vector and m the mass of the
ball. We also know that ~w ¼ m~g and obtain by insertion
and simpliﬁcation:
~g ¼~a ð4Þ
Thus, the value of the acceleration of the ball is equal to
the constant value of the terrestrial acceleration.
With air resistance, a friction force ~f is also applied to
the ball. The second law of Newton still applies, therefore:
~wþ~f ¼ m~a ð5Þ
By insertion and simpliﬁcation, we obtain:
~a ¼~g þ
~f
m
ð6Þ
As we can see from Eq. (6), ball acceleration depends on
ball mass. Furthermore, in the case of a ball falling verti-
cally, Eq. (6) leads to the following diﬀerential equation
(from which the kinematics of the ball can be obtained):
dm
dt
¼ g km
2
m
; ð7Þ
where k = 0.5 · Cr · Rhau · A, Cr being the drag coeﬃ-
cient of a ball, Rhau the air density and A the cross-sec-
tional area of the ball.
With air resistance aﬀecting acceleration, velocity and
TTC are also aﬀected. One could argue that the diﬀerence
between the TTC estimation neglecting friction and the real
TTC when action is triggered, is small enough to permit
successful interception. However, this statement is doubt-
ful. For instance, the TTC of a table tennis ball falling from
a height of 2 m with and without air resistance would be
671 and 638 ms, respectively; a diﬀerence between both
TTCs of 33 ms. Even if corrected during the fall by visual
information about ball’s position and velocity, the TTC
estimation using a constant value of 9.81 m/s2 as given
by the internal model of gravity would prevent the ball
interception. For example, 300 ms before the ball reaches
the interception point, its acceleration has decreased due
to air resistance to 8.06 m/s2. The use of an acceleration
value of 9.81 m/s2, speciﬁed at the moment of ball release,
would lead participants to estimate a TTC of 280 ms, cor-
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are quite important when one considers that the timing
accuracy of interception can be as small as 5 ms (Regan,
1997). Hence, the eﬀect of air resistance should not be
neglected, especially in the case of light balls. The implica-
tion is that the use of a quantitative internal model of grav-
ity should be complimented by the use an internal model of
friction and knowledge of ball’s mass to obtain accurate
estimates of TTC. The use of such knowledge is theoreti-
cally possible even if it seems to be quite complex (Craig,
Berton, Rao, Fernandez, & Bootsma, 2006; Oberle, McBe-
ath, Madigan, & Sugar, 2005). Evidence remains to be pro-
vided in support of this position.
Another limit of the quantitative internal model of grav-
ity is related to the very small perimeter in which it could be
brought into play. In other words, its use seems to be lim-
ited to the unique case of balls in free fall. In the numerous
studies on this topic, no generalisation to other situations
with parabolic trajectories has been envisaged. Regan
(1997) claimed that ignorance of gravitational acceleration
in cricket prevents the batsman from determining precisely
if the ball will contact the wicket and bounce before being
struck. This diﬃculty in predicting ball ﬂight on a para-
bolic trajectory is said to be one of the reasons why it is
not easy to time the hitting of a cricket ball. Similar diﬃcul-
ties have been reported in baseball for estimating the height
of pitch to hit the ball (Gray, 2002). The non-use of the
internal model of gravity with parabolic trajectory limits
considerably its interest. It would be quite surprising that
the brain would have developed such an accurate but com-
plex strategy only for situations of vertical fall which are
neither frequent nor critical for the survival of the species
or for success in high speed ball game.
2. Discussion
In this article, we have reviewed empirical evidence sup-
posedly supporting the internal model of gravity. We have
shown that these studies have methodological problems
and that alternative interpretations exist. In addition, we
showed that the internalization of a single value of g (i.e.,
9.81 m/s2) does not permit accurate interception of a free
falling ball submitted to air resistance because the acceler-
ation of the ball decreases during its fall and the use of a
constant value of g would impair the estimation of TTC.
We believe that these issues question the use of a quantita-
tive internal model of gravity or at least minimize its rele-
vance for interceptive actions.
However, this article does not call into question the fact
that representations (whether implicit or explicit) or a pri-
ori expectations could be used to intercept moving objects.
Strong evidence for this position is reported by de Lussa-
net, Smeets, and Brenner (2002), who showed that the
characteristics of a trial (velocity of the object, abrupt
and unpredictable change of the position of the target) or
context (change in resistance applied to the interceptive
movement) inﬂuence the next interception movement (ini-tial direction of motion and spatial error). In fact, we agree
with Proﬃtt and Kaiser (1998) that the geometrical proper-
ties of objects (e.g., conservation of the shape of an object
during its motion) are internalized and may be used to esti-
mate TTC (Lo´pez-Moliner, Brenner, & Smeets, in press).
However, although we can accept that an implicit knowl-
edge of physics may bias our spatial memory of an object
that abruptly disappeared (Hubbard, 1995), we still wonder
whether internalized gravity is used in interceptive actions
even though gravity is omnipresent and there is a theoret-
ical advantage to be gained if it can be perceived. This
statement is consistent with observations of Todd (1981),
who argued that all information or perceptual strategies
potentially available for controlling actions were not sys-
tematically used.
Nevertheless, since there is no deﬁnite evidence in favour
of a quantitative internalization of gravitational accelera-
tion, one of the issues that remain to be explored concerns
how humans adjust their actions to objects accelerating
and decelerating under gravitational inﬂuence when trying
to intercept. Concerning the timing of the eﬀector, a few
studies have investigated whether an optical variable(s)
may initiate or guide interceptive movement. Lee et al.
(1983) studied the information used when punching a ball
accelerated by gravity and concluded that the evolution
of knee and elbow angles during the fall of the ball could
be explained by the use of s(h). The authors argued that
even if s(h) gives access to TTC1 and not to the exact
TTC, TTC1 is accurate enough when it is used with a type
of control in which a continuous coupling between percep-
tual and motor systems allow on-line adjustments of
action; as previously mentioned here, TTC1 converges
towards TTC in the course of time (Fig. 1) and therefore
the diﬀerence becomes negligible.
Unfortunately, however, the study of Lee et al. (1983)
has not been without criticism. Wann (1996) argued for
his part that results showing the use of s(h) could simply
be due to an artefact of the analysis. Other methodolog-
ical problems led Michaels, Zeinstra, and Oudejans
(2001) to reproduce the same experiment with a better
control of the independent variables. The results partly
contradict those of Lee et al. (1983) since Michaels
et al. (2001) found that the optical variable used to ini-
tiate and guide knee and elbow angles was h 0 (the expan-
sion velocity of the ball) rather than s(h), even if s(h)
ﬁtted better the data of certain participants in speciﬁc
conditions. Still, it is important to note that this experi-
ment did not reveal any evidence for the use of TTC2,
which would be consistent with the involvement of an
internal model of gravity. Moreover, the two optical
variables identiﬁed in this experiment avoid the theoreti-
cal criticism of the eﬀect of air resistance on the estima-
tion of TTC addressed to the internal model of gravity.
This is obvious for h 0, which does not give access to
TTC and thus cannot lead to a wrong estimation of
TTC because of air resistance. The use of s(h) involves
a continuous regulation of action to minimize potential
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air resistance inﬂuence.
Results of authors such as Michaels et al. (2001), and
van der Kamp, Savelsbergh, and Smeets (1997) also high-
lighted diﬀerences between monocular and binocular view-
ing conditions, suggesting the exploitation of diﬀerent
optical cues depending on viewing conditions. Caljouw,
van der Kamp, and Savelsbergh (2004) proposed that mul-
tiple optical variables are implicated in the regulation of
interceptive actions. According to these authors, the envi-
ronmental and organic constraints that determine the spec-
iﬁcity of the task would lead to the use of either a single
source of information among several alternatives, or a
combination of these multiple sources of information
[e.g., s(h), h 0, binocular disparity, relative size of the object,
occlusion, g (a combination of optical size and rate of
expansion, Lo´pez-Moliner & Bonnet, 2002)]. This combi-
nation could be made either by summation or multiplica-
tion of several weighted sources of information, with the
weights being attributed according to task constraints
(DeLucia, Kaiser, Bush, Meyer, & Sweet, 2003; Rushton
& Wann, 1999; Smith, Flach, Dittman, & Stanard, 2001).
It has thus been demonstrated that ecological invariants
picked-up from the environment (Gibson, 1979) are not the
only base for timing interceptive actions and that other
information, such as perceptual cues or prior knowledge
of the behaviour of the target, could be taken into
consideration.
To summarize, if the initial idea of an exclusive one-to-
one mapping between information and movement is now
rejected by many researchers (e.g., Caljouw et al., 2004),
a prospective type of control presents several advantages
in comparison to a predictive one supported by an internalFig. 3. Evolution in time of acceleration, velocity and position for a table tenni
Federation regulation). At 0.726 s after the release of the ball, the acceleration
more than 0.3 m/s2.model of gravity. A prospective control establishes a par-
ticular relationship (a law of control, Warren, 1988)
between information and movement (e.g., Dessing, Bull-
ock, Peper, & Beek, 2002). Accordingly, action needs on-
line control on the basis of information specifying the rela-
tionship between the actor and the environment (e.g.,
Michaels, Jacobs, & Bongers, 2006). The value of the infor-
mation, which can vary with time, is used as a continuous
guide for action timing. In interceptive actions, continuous
guidance is used to reach the right place at the right time
without any a priori knowledge of this time and this place
(Peper, Bootsma, Mestre, & Bakker, 1994). Predictive
models give rise to predictions of time and/or place of con-
tact, which are used to program the movement before its
initiation. The movement may be corrected (or re-pro-
grammed) if necessary during the unfolding of the act on
the basis of a comparison between expected and actual sen-
sory feedbacks (e.g., Pisella et al., 2000; Teixeira, Chua,
Nagelkerke, & Franks, 2006). Zago et al. (2004) argue that
the internalization of gravity is combined with on-line
visual information about position and velocity of the object
to predict the exact TTC. Consequently, TTC predictions
could be corrected during the fall of the object, which could
overcome the possible modiﬁcation of TTC caused by air
resistance. However, even if position and velocity informa-
tion may be updated during the fall of the ball, the change
in the acceleration value is not updated, which would pre-
vent access to exact TTC when the speciﬁc value of 9.81 m/
s2 does not match the real acceleration (Fig. 3). A prospec-
tive type of control would allow accurate timing when the
ball is submitted to the eﬀect of air resistance, as opposed
to the use of a constant value of acceleration in a predictive
model. Moreover, it would allow a more economical types ball in free fall (diameter 4 cm and mass 2.7 g, International Table Tennis
has been divided by two, and 2 s after the release, the acceleration is no
2990 R. Baure`s et al. / Vision Research 47 (2007) 2982–2991of control in which it is not necessary to learn and store an
exact value of g and in which no complex calculation is
required to predict the exact TTC.
Here, we claim that timing of interceptive actions cannot
be based on an internal model of gravity that would give a
quantitative and perfect prediction of the real TTC. How-
ever, we agree that a basic knowledge of the eﬀect of grav-
ity could be used in speciﬁc situations to modulate the
timing of interceptive actions. We suggest that this is an
example of using ‘‘qualitative implicit physics knowledge’’
to describe the motor advantage it could provide in react-
ing faster or earlier when the ball is expected to accelerate
under the eﬀect of gravity (e.g., McIntyre et al., 2001; Senot
et al., 2005). This conclusion is in agreement with the work
of Hecht (Hecht, 2001; Hecht & Bertamini, 2000; Hecht,
Kaiser, & Banks, 1996). Theoretically, an observer could
use the constancy of the value of gravity to estimate the
absolute size and distance of a free falling object. However,
Hecht et al. (1996) showed that even if participants inter-
nalize some abstraction of gravity, they do not use this spe-
ciﬁc knowledge to a degree suﬃcient enough to succeed in
their judgement.
Because knowledge of the eﬀect of gravity could only be
used in very speciﬁc situations when intercepting objects in
free fall, we believe that the role of gravity has been consid-
erably exaggerated. The eﬀect of gravity could belong to
one of the environmental constraints proposed by Caljouw
et al. (2004), and could be used in combination with other
sources of information to intercept the object (DeLucia
et al., 2003). The weight applied to this information could
take a zero value when for example a ball rolls on the
ground (e. g., in football), or a value of one when the ball
is moving vertically (e. g., in the jump ball in basketball).
Hence, the motor system would be ‘‘warned’’ that the tim-
ing of action should be modulated and that the interceptive
movement should be adapted to begin earlier and or to be
executed faster in case of downward motion of the ball and
conversely; the opposite applies in the case of upward
motion. For these reasons, we prefer to deﬁne this process
as a qualitative implicit physics knowledge rather than as
an internal model: people only know the eﬀect of gravity
and do not really have internalized this constant.
3. Conclusion
We have shown that evidence presented to support the
assumption of a predictive and accurate internal model of
gravity in the timing of interceptive actions can be called
into question, and that the use of an internal model of
gravity to access the exact TTC of a falling object should
embody air resistance eﬀects, which has been neglected by
the proponents of a quantitative internal model of grav-
ity. However, some results suggest a qualitative modulat-
ing eﬀect of gravity (e.g., McIntyre et al., 2001; Senot
et al., 2005) in which this knowledge might simply lead
to the expectation of an increase of velocity for a ball
in free fall. Consequently, we reject the actual demonstra-tion of the use of a quantitative internal model of gravity.
Instead, we propose that a prospective type of control
based on multiple sources of visual information, com-
bined with a qualitative knowledge of the basic eﬀect of
gravity, could be suﬃcient to intercept an object in free
fall. Hence, the existence of a quantitative internal model
of gravity is unlikely according to Occam’s razor princi-
ple, which states that ‘‘entities should not be multiplied
beyond necessity’’. We propose that the brain follows
Occam’s razor principle rather than internalizing New-
ton’s laws. The challenge for future research is to measure
how qualitative implicit physics knowledge aﬀects timing
of interceptive actions, especially by identifying the move-
ment parameters that are modiﬁed (e.g., initiation time,
movement velocity). This research could examine how
optical variables used to initiate or guide interceptive
actions may be modulated by an a priori qualitative
knowledge of the eﬀect of gravity.Acknowledgments
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